New SCKit Worm Infects 288 Endpoints via ScreenConnect
Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a new malware campaign involving SCKit, a worm-like toolkit abusing ConnectWise ScreenConnect to deploy rogue remote-access clients and establish persistent access.
According to Huntress, attackers compromised at least 288 endpoints across 48 organizations within approximately 90 minutes on November 11, 2026.
The attackers used ScreenConnect’s legitimate Run Command functionality to execute malicious instructions with SYSTEM privileges, allowing them to deploy malware across multiple managed endpoints.
How SCKit Spreads Through ScreenConnect
The infection begins with attackers downloading a rogue ScreenConnect installer to C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi.
A malicious batch script, sckit-run.bat, subsequently retrieves encrypted PowerShell payloads and installs the SCKit toolkit under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap.
The malware establishes persistence through a scheduled task named TrapWatch and attempts to replace legitimate ScreenConnect client functionality.
Researchers discovered that SCKit contains 16 components designed to maintain access, intercept authentication sessions and potentially spread between managed systems.
The toolkit also attempts to steal ScreenConnect .aspxauth session cookies from technicians connecting to compromised endpoints.
However, Huntress has not observed successful technician-to-panel propagation.
Why Traditional Malware Detection May Miss SCKit
A particularly concerning aspect is SCKit’s use of legitimate remote-management software as an attack channel.
Rather than relying entirely on an unfamiliar executable, attackers install an additional ScreenConnect client and manipulate the existing connection.
This creates a detection challenge because organizations may already have numerous authorized ScreenConnect processes running.
Another complication involves machine-specific payload generation.
Huntress found that the toolkit retrieves encrypted components using individual Windows machine identifiers, while certain malicious executables are compiled separately for each host.
Consequently, traditional file-hash-based detection may miss infections with different payload hashes.
Security teams should therefore compare installed ScreenConnect client identifiers and relay destinations against approved configurations.
Unexpected secondary clients, unauthorized Run Command activity and repeated modifications to legitimate ScreenConnect services may provide stronger behavioral evidence.
A Critical Risk for MSP Technician Workstations
The campaign exposes another operational weakness: technicians investigating infected endpoints could become additional targets.
SCKit’s code attempts to transfer malicious files to connecting technicians and reuse stolen authentication sessions to reach other managed systems.
Huntress advises administrators to avoid interactive ScreenConnect sessions with suspected infected machines.
Instead, organizations should investigate through trusted EDR or out-of-band management tools, revoke exposed sessions and inspect scheduled tasks.
ConnectWise has disabled five potentially associated third-party extensions across approximately 400 partner environments as a precaution.
The incident demonstrates how compromised remote-management access can rapidly expand an attacker’s reach without requiring exploitation of individual customer systems.
SCKit detection checklist
| Detection area | What security teams should investigate |
|---|---|
| Rogue ScreenConnect clients | Unexpected client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 or ed630cc2c873b091 |
| Scheduled tasks | Unauthorized TrapWatch task |
| Suspicious directory | C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\ |
| Network indicators | Connections to 185.99.255[.]28 or sc.payproofkit[.]com |
| ScreenConnect audit history | Unexpected mass Run Command execution or Shared Toolbox activity |
| Technician workstations | Suspicious file transfers and potential authentication-session exposure |
These indicators are documented in the Huntress investigation.
An effective way to investigate this campaign is to build a timeline connecting suspicious ScreenConnect Run Command events, the endpoints that received them, and subsequent technician connections. This can help identify potentially exposed technician workstations even when no malware alert was generated. It is a recommended investigative approach, not a separately confirmed finding from the campaign.
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